| 英文摘要 |
For the past ten years, political reform on Taiwan has been concentrated on three main
efforts : (1) constitutional reforms, (2) reinventing government, and (3) congressional reforms. All
these works aim to bring in bore democratic and effective governance to our ruling system. This goal
also impels us to face the classical perplexities between democracy and bureaucracy. From this
viewpoint, many failed reform efforts should not be simply attributed to the problem of democracy in
the public decision-making process, or to the issue of bureaucratic effectiveness. Those failures
should be interpreted as problems of redefining the boundary between democracy and bureaucracy in
Taiwan's governing structure. The political control of the bureaucracy is at the heart of the problem.
From the concept of "delegation of power," author attempts to establish an unified framework to
analyze the problem of bureaucratic control in the newly developed Taiwanese democracy. Building
on the agency theory from the new institutional economics, author discuses different means and their
limits to control bureaucratic activities in general. Then, author derives three assertions from the
theory to demonstrate the current situation concerning controlling bureaucracies in Taiwan. They are :
(1) bureaucratic "inaction," (2) dominated populace; (3) KMT's (Kuomintang) "lock-in" effect. At
the end. Author proposes three general directions for the democratic reform concerning bureaucratic
control on Taiwan in the future. |
