國家圖書館 期刊文獻資訊網

連結國家圖書館 連結期刊文獻資訊網

臺灣期刊論文索引

摘要

本篇出處 東吳哲學學報 36 2017.08[民106.08] 頁1-34
篇名 黑格爾論思辯與概念
作者 史偉民
中文摘要   本文將首先檢視幾種對於黑格爾的判斷觀念的解釋,指出在對「判斷中的繫詞意指同一性」之命題的解釋中,學者們或者認為黑格爾使用「同一性」一詞的方式不合常規,或者認為他使用「判斷中的繫詞意指同一性」此一命題的方式不合常規。相對於此,本文主張黑格爾以不合常規的方式使用「判斷」一詞,而用之意指面對對象,企圖發現其實在定義的思維;相反地,思辯命題則表達人類思維對實在的範疇架構。一系列的思辯命題,因之呈現了對象本身的發展,也就是此一對象之概念的發展──此即黑格爾所主張的「概念之運動」,此一觀念預設了一種非形式邏輯概念。
英文摘要   This paper begins with examining some interpretations of Hegel's doctrine of judgment. It will be demonstrated that, while interpreting Hegel's claim that the copula in the judgment means identity, scholars either think that Hegel uses the term "identity" unconventionally or that he uses the proposition "the copula in the judgment means identity" in a unconventional way. It is maintained in this paper that Hegel uses the term "judgment" unconventionally to mean the thinking that attempts to achieve the real definition of the object. In contrast, the speculative proposition expresses human thinking's categorial structuring of reality. The series of speculative propositions, therefore, presents the development of the object as well as the development the concept of the object. This is what Hegel names as the movement of concept, which presupposes a kind of non-formal-logical concept.