國家圖書館 期刊文獻資訊網

連結國家圖書館 連結期刊文獻資訊網

臺灣期刊論文索引

摘要

本篇出處 中外文學 47:3=462 2018.09[民107.09] 頁119-184
篇名 1966年的夏季到冬季:毛澤東的文革時間與共產主義戰略
作者 邱彥彬
中文摘要   巴迪烏認為,作為共產主義運動再發動的文革,為陷入困境的國際共產主義運動提供了一套解決方案。不意外地,「反動」因此成為1996年6月到10月這段文革時間的核心概念。在毛、黨機器與紅衛兵運動的三方角力中,何種領導的作為屬於革命、何種又屬於反動,這是這段時期毛認定的主要矛盾所在,魯索所謂「支持或反對政治組織的無限繁衍」,正是從這個主要矛盾中派生出來的重要議題。但支持或反對或許不是重點,如何支持如何反對才是關鍵所在。面對群眾運動,黨國機器的負責幹部究竟是被動因應,還是主動領導?組織運動時的各種考慮,究竟是為了達成健全黨國機器、鞏固無產階級專政的戰術目的,還是為了過渡到共產主義,完成搗毀黨國機器、為國家的「凋零」創設條件的戰略目標?如本文所示,文革初期的毛堅定選擇了後者,中立或妥協並不是以回歸無產階級專政本體為念的領導人該有的選項。從6到10月,不管是對黨國機器一以貫之的批判,還是從賦予紅衛兵運動「毛之名」到撤回名號的轉折,毛反反動的立場從來沒有改變。借用巴迪烏的概念,從夏季到冬季的三次非制度性集中與命名舉措,目的無非是讓文革創始「事件」得以延續,極大化紅衛兵「脫離於黨機器」的造反能量。或許反過來說會更精確:在黨國機器的反動戰術一一出台之際,承接、固定、並放大造反能量的三次「刀切」,接續活絡了停滯下來的文革時間,遭到黨國機器與紅衛兵運動接連阻滯的運動因而「有所發展」,打開了1966年的夏季得以朝冬季綿延開展的可能性。同樣的道理,在「天下大治」等現實原則的催逼之下,1967年開春之際文革運動突然急轉直下,主要的原因在於毛修正了原本堅定的「集中」原則,「毛之名」倒向舊黨國機器的結果,甫開啟的文革時間也隨即遭到關閉
英文摘要   According to Alain Badiou, the Chinese Cultural Revolution provides the beleaguered communist movements with a set of solutions. It goes to great lengths to wrest the emancipatory politics from the post-Stalinist impasse by re-activating the communist movement and fending off every possible opposition with remarkable obduracy. It therefore comes as no surprise that "reactionary line" is the idea central to the time of the Cultural Revolution that lasts from June to October 1966. In the constant tug-of-war among Mao, Party-state apparatuses, and the Red Guard movement during this period, how to distinguish reactionary leadership qualities from revolutionary ones is in Mao's eyes the main contradiction to be reckoned with. In this entire sequence, the crucial issue of "pro or against the unlimited multiplication of political organizations," which has been accurately identified by Alessandro Russo, is in fact the vexed question derived from this contradiction. If the main contradiction is kept in perspective, the real crux of the matter will be less "pro or against" than the specific forms the endorsement and objection would assume. When the leadership in the CPC is confronted with the mass movement, do they simply stay reactive to the explosive force, or just toss themselves into the hurricane on their own initiative? Do they lead the movement in order to keep the party-state apparatuses intact and consolidate the dictatorship of the proletariat, or with an eye to destroying the party organs and paving the way for the "withering away" of the state? As a founder of the proletarian regime in China and a committed crusader for communism, Mao unambiguously favors the latter. Neutrality or the readiness to compromise is the most unlikely option for a leader who never ceases to drive home the true tenor of the dictatorship of the proletariat. From June to October, Mao's anti-reactionary attitude is unwavering. The partystate apparatuses have never been spared the ordeal of his open and harsh castigation for their reactionary containment of the movement. The fate of the Red Guards is no less grim. When Mao is ascertained in October that their initial readiness, in Alain Badiou's verbiage, to "separate" themselves from the party-state apparatuses is irrevocably compromised, he decidedly withdraws his support and "name" in a bid to sustain the revolting spirits of these young rebels. Borrowing Badiou's words again, we may say that the three non-institutional actions of "concentration" that Mao takes in June, August, and October respectively are all aimed to perpetuate the founding "event" of the Cultural Revolution and maximize the revolting energies that has effectively jammed the party-state machine. Or to argue the point the other way round, in the strenuous efforts to counter the reactionary force that is obstinately on the defensive, Mao decidedly launches three "cuts" to "re-begin" the time of the Cultural Revolution and precipitate the unimpeded movement from summer to winter, which is then rendered stagnant by the part-state apparatuses and the rebel-turned-conservative Red Guards. By the same token, when the reality principle of "return to order" becomes imperative, the Cultural Revolution faces an ineluctable spiral downturn in the spring of 1967. It is the time when the name of Mao derives its efficacy less from the mass movement than from the assistance of party-state apparatuses. With the premature retreat from the principle of "concentration," the rebellious energy of the mass movement is quickly dissipated, and the entire mass movement is then plunged into an anarchic closure